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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

DAVID KAAE, KEITH WAYNE
EWER & MICHAEL HORNE,

Case No.

12904

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of second degree
bur;?fo.ry, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-3, and grand larceny,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-38-1 and 76-38-3.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellants were tried and convicted of second
degree burglary and grand larceny in the District Court
in and for Cache County, before the Honorable VeNoy
rse11.
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RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision of the
lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 31st, 1971, Keith Plowman, owner of
Keith's Market (R. 13), found that his store had been
broken into and merchandise had been stolen. The mer·
chandise was of a value in excess of $50. On September
3, 1971, two officers from the Logan City Police Depart.
ment went to an apartment located at 970 No1th Seventh
East (R. 4, 32) pursuant to an informant's tip concerning
the burglary (R. 8, 38) . During the investigation a quan·
tity of the stolen merchandise was found in the apartment
and resulted in the arrest of the appellants. Each appel·
lant upon proper constitutional warning wrote and signed
a statement implicating himself and others (R. 53, 92, 93,
112, 113).
After the hearing on the motion to suppress the evi·
dence taken from the apartment and to suppress the writ·
ten statements, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen dis·
cussed his findings and conclusions. First he discussed
the possibility of the appellant's consent to search their
apartment and the relevant facts involved (R. 173, 174,
175), and concluded as follows:
". . . I think it even went further than that
and that after this point that there was a consent
and in fact an assistance in accomplishing the
turning up of other evidence in the house, and on
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that basis, 1 would deny the motion to suppress
the evidence taken ... " (R. 175).
Secondly, he discussed the possibility of the confessions
being invalid and concluded that the conduct of the officers in securing the statements was not of a "compelling
but voluntary (R. 175, 176, 177). He subsequently dismissed the motions.
The testimony of Officers Leon Wursten and Richard
Wright cany significant weight in this appeal. Their
testimony in substance is as follows:
Officer Leon Wursten testified that he and Officer
Richard Wright went to an apartment located at 970
North Seventh East based on an informant's tip that
David I(aae was involved in the burglary of Keith's Mar(R. 4, 8). Upon arriving the officers knocked on the
door and Keith Ewer answered (R. 4). The officers identified themselves and stated that they wanted to talk to
David Kaae (R. 5, 12). Officer Wursten testified that
Mr. Ewer's reply was, "Come in, he's in the kitchen" (R.
5). The officer further testified that " ... when we got
into the kitchen, we found pencils and the type of glue
and the type of razor blades that were taken from the
market in bulk on the kitchen counter" (R. 9). The basis
for this knowledge was a list that the owner of Keith's
Market had given them (R. 2, 12, 13). With reference
to the items identified above, Officer Wursten testified
more specifically:
"Well, the LePages airplane type glue there
was a couple of tubes .. There were some pencJ:;:,
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lead pencils. They were quite unique in themselves. They had part leads in these pencils.
They'd only been on the market just a very short
time. It was a type of pencil when the point get;
dull you pull the point out, push it in the back
and push a new point out so this is quite an un'.
usual pencil, and there were some razor blades
there were three or four packages of razor
on the counter" (R. 12, 13).
The officer then testified that he told David Kaae
that they were aware of what was going on, and asked
him if he wanted to show them where the rest of the
"contraband" was hidden. "And he said, 'You bet;' and
he showed us right in. He took us around and showed
us where the different things were. He was pulling things
out of the cabinets and taking the contraband out of the
cabinets and starting to stack it on the kitchen counter"
(R. 9, 10, 14). Subsequently, David Kaae was arrested
and given the Miranda warning, and then he gave a
ten statement as to his part in the burglary (R. 15).
Officer Richard Wright testified that he and Leon
Wursten went to the apartment at the above address t:o
talk to David Kaae (R. 32, 52). They knocked on the
door and Keith Ewer answered, and they identified them·
selves as police officers (R. 33, 34, 53). He testified that
Mr. Ewer stated that David Kaae was in the kitchen,
and then invited them in (R. 35). Officer Wright further :
testified that their search was by permission (R. 40).
David Kaae and Wayne Ewer rented the apartment
(R. 28, 52). Wayne Ewer gave the officer permission t;o
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go back to the apa1tment to make a more thorough
search (R. 54) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN
ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE WHICH
WAS FOUND IN THE APARTMENT LOCATED AT 970 NORTH SEVENTH EAST,
LOGAN, UTAH.
This court in discussing a judge's duties when determining the admissibility of evidence held in State v.
Tuttk, 16 Utah 2d 288, 399 P. 2d 580, 582, cert. denied,
382 U. S. 872, 86 S. Ct. 129, 15 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1965):
"The practical exigencies of a trial render it
imperative that the trial judge have the prerogative of ruling upon questions of admissibility of
evidence. And upon issues of fact incident to that
purpose. For this reason, and because of his position of advantage to observe the demeanor of witnesses and other factors bearing on credibility, his
ruling thereon should not be disturbed unless it
clearly appears that he was in error. If they were
not indulged the prerogative and were bound by
any story which a self-interested witness may tell
which would make a ·search unlawful, it requires
but brief reflection to reveal what mischief could
result in thwarting efforts of officers proceeding
reasonably and in good faith to solve crimes and
enforce the law."
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To the same effect see State v. Criscol,a, 21 Utah 2d 272,
444 P. 2d G7, 519 (1938); United States v. Page, 302 F.
'.Zd Sl (9th Cir. 1962). In the case at bar the trial judge
considered the credibility of the witnesses, and the facts
derived therefrom, and concluded that the search was by
"consent" and with the assistance of David Kaae (R. 173,
174, 175). However, appellants allege that the search and
seizure was illegal. Respondent submits that the officer's
conduct in this case was less than that of the officers in
the case of State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 387 P. 2d 240
( 1963) , and the court held that the search and seizure
was legal. The court W'.lS determining whether a search
of· the defendant's motel room was unreasonable. The
officers were investigating a series of felonies and had
gone to the defendant's motel room pursuant to an in·
formants "tip." The exact nature of the information was
not disclosed, but it was apparently sufficiently reliable
that the officers acted upon it. First, they went to the
owner and asked to enter the room whereupon they found
a stolen pistol in a drawer. The officers replaced the
pistol and waited outside for the occupants. Upon defendant's arrival the police frisked them for weapons.
This court at 242 wrote:

"The officers aver that they then asked il
they 'could take a look around' to which the defendant replied, 'Yes, you can come in, and loo
around.' The position of the defendant is
said 'Would it make any difference if I ob]ecterl:
made the search and in addition to n,,
pistol, found two wrist watches and some crowba' 3
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which also had come from Harmon's Shopping
Center."
This court, based on the facts set forth above stated that
it could not find anything ruthless or high-handed about
the officer's conduct and, therefore, the evidence was
properly achnitted. Respondent urges that this court consider the facts as set forth in this case in relation to State
v. Louden, supra, and render a like holding as to the
admissibility of the evidence.
To supplement the "consent" argument respondent
submits that the plain view doctrine can be applied in
this case. In Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 88
S. Ct. 992, 993, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1968), the United
States Supreme Court wrote:
"It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."
This court has treated the plain view doctrine in a number of cases, and has accepted the use of evidence secured
thereby. See State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.
2d 276 (1972); State v. Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.
2d 651 (1972); State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P. 2d
535 (1964).

The officer's testimony in this case proves that the
Supreme Court's test has been met. They were invited
into the apartment, and taken into the kitchen where
they saw the stolen merchandise sitting on the kitchen
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counter (R. 2, 9, 12, 13) . This merchandise was described
in an
list given to the officers by the owner of
the store (R. 2, 12, 13). Furthermore, Officer Wursten
described some of the items with significant particularity
(R. 12, 13) which indicates he was well informed as w
the type of merchandise stolen. Consequently, respondent submits that these items are admissible as evidence
under the plain view doctrine.

POINT II.
APPELLANTS' CONFESSIONS \VERE AD·
MISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
It was detennined by the Honorable VeNoy Chris·
t.offersen that each appellant's confession was volunt.ary
(R. 176, 177) . Furthe1more, testimony given by each
appellant clearly prove that they were apprised of their
constitutional rights and understood them (R. 63, 92, 93,
112, 113) . Therefore, the rule set forth in State v. Mares,
113 Utah 425, 192 P. 2d 861 (1948), is applicable in this
case. This court at 870 wrote:
" ... a confession is not admissible in evidence
unless it was voluntarily made; that this question
must be determined by the court from all of th.e
evidence from both sides bearing thereon; that il
the court is satisfied from the evidence that
confession was voluntary, then the court admit'
the confession in evidence . . . "
Respondent submits that all the facts and circumst.ances
in this case prove the legality of admitting the appellant'i
confessions i.11 evidence.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the search and seizure of
the merchandise located in appellant's apartment was
with the consent and aid of appellants and, therefore,
legal and admissible as evidence. Since the search and
seizure was legal the confessions were not secured improperly. On the contrary, they were given volunt.arily
and were properly admitted in evidence. Therefore, resondent respectfully submits that the decision of the
lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

